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Abstract 
This paper examines the relationship between political instability and stock market returns us-
ing quarterly time series data from 1993 to 2013. In this paper, stock market returns are defined 
as the returns of the general stock market index and banking index for 18 OECD countries. Five 
different political instability indicators are constructed in order to measure political uncertainty. 
The empirical part utilizes the EFA, PCA and GARCH-M methodologies. The findings indicate 
a direct and an indirect impact between the PI indicators and the returns of the Banking Index 
and the Overall Stock Market Index. The research contributes to the literature by providing 
empirical evidence to policy makers on the effects that political instability has on stock markets. 
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1. Introduction 
The impact of political instability (PI) on financial market performance has been a significant  
topic of debate over the last years. The relationship between PI and stock markets has been 
widely examined in the empirical literature, especially after the recent financial crisis. Diamonte 
et al. (1996) and Lehkonen and Heimonen (2015), show that a reduction in political risk could 
lead to higher portfolio and stock returns. Huang et al. (2015) find a positive relationship 
between international political risks and government bond yields. Smales (2014) uses the 
Australian federal elections as a proxy for political uncertainty. He shows evidence that this 
political uncertainty proxy has a significant impact on the uncertainty of the financial markets. 
Li and Born (2006) and Gemmill (1992) also provide evidence of a strong relationship between 
the elections and the financial markets. Addoum and Kumar (2016) examine the effects of 
political climate changes on financial market outcomes. The number of elections, the transition 
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between the power of political parties and the political alignment index (PAI) are used as PI 
variables. They show that the investor demand is influenced by the shifts in the political climate. 
Moreover, these changes affect the returns of firms and industries that are politically sensitive. 
Some other studies use as PI variables or as a part of those, terrorism actions and events. That 
studies shows evidence of a strong negative relationship between terrorism actions/events and 
financial markets (Jackson, 2008; Chesney at al., 2011).  
While the theoretical part of PI has been widely studied the empirical part seems to have 
space for further research. The multidimensionality of PI is a topic that has not been studied 
enough. There are only a few studies that examine this issue. For example, Bussiere and Mulder 
(1999) used various indicators that quantify PI during the crisis episodes of 1994 and 1997 in 
order to examine the effects of PI on economic vulnerability. Additionally, Jong-A-Pin (2009) 
examined the  impact of 25 different PI indicators  on economic growth. However the first study 
is largely outdated, while Jong-A-Pin’s (2009) study – as most PI related studies – provides 
similar measures for a large set of countries that are being examined all together in a panel.  We 
believe that PI is a very complex issue to be examined in a way that aggregates data for many 
countries with different characteristics, both market/economy related but also political 
environment related. Therefore, in this paper we are trying to fill this gap by examining the 
multidimensionality of PI on a country level with time series data that allow for different PI 
indicators for each country. We aim to reanalyze the notion of PI and to estimate its impact on 
the returns and the variance (volatility) of the banking and general stock market indices. In 
order to achieve this, we construct five different PI indicators by using 27 different PI variables. 
These variables are mentioned in the corresponding empirical literature of political uncertainty. 
We apply Exploratory Factor Analysis (hereafter EFA), Principal Components Analysis 
(hereafter PCA) and the econometric method of GARCH-M, in order to examine for possible 
negative effects between PI, banking stock returns and overall stock market returns. We use 
quarterly time series data for 18 OECD countries from 1993 to 2013. By using time series data 
we can test for possible  PI effects on the conditional variance of the banking stock returns and 
the overall stock market returns. Our results – contrary to most studies that simply quantify the 
negative effects of PI – show that not all political PI indicators have the same importance with 
regards to stock market and banking sector returns and volatilities. In fact while in general we 
find a direct/indirect negative impact of the five PI indicators on the banking and general stock 
market returns/on the variance of banking and general stock market returns, some PI indicators 
are non-significant, while some others suggest the possibility of a positive effect coming from 
some PI indicators. Finally, we also observe that there are different effects from different PI 
indicators to market stock returns and banking returns which makes the issue even more 
complicated. Therefore, from this more analytical, country focused time series approach, the 
current research contributes to the literature by providing to policy makers a deeper 
understanding of the possible effects that PI has on stock markets producing some new results. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the proposed methodology. 
Section 3 describes the dataset, and Section 4 reports and analyzes the empirical results. 
Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Methodology 
For the empirical part of this paper, we first employ the EFA. This statistical technique is used 
in order to reduce a large set of variables into a smaller set of variables and to indentify the 
structure of their relationship (Fabriger and Wegener, 2011). Next, we use the EFA in order to 
sort the 27 PI variables and to obtain for each country the most significant variables according 
to their loadings. Furthermore, we determine the PI indicators (hereafter PI indicators) and 
specify the variables by which each indicator consists. After this variable separation we employ 
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the PCA in order to construct the PI indicators from the variables obtained from the EFA 
procedure. These new indicators are constructed from an initial set of variables (𝑋𝑗, 𝑗 =
1,2, … , 𝑘). The PCA transforms the data in that way that the greatest variance comes to lie on 
the first principal component and the second greatest variance on the second principal 
component. The same procedure is followed for the third greatest variance, and so on.  
Before proceeding with our methodology, we test for possible correlations between the PI 
indicators. The coefficients show us how strongly pairs of indicators are related. After this 
procedure some of the indicators are excluded from the further analysis of specific countries 
because of their high correlation. For the main empirical part we focus at the uncertainty that 
PI indicators have. Thus we look at the conditional variance of the output. Moreover, if we 
want to allow uncertainty to affect stock market or banking stock returns directly, then we 
estimate the GARCH-M model. This model allows us to test if the uncertainty in the returns 
could affect the returns of the stock market and banking indices and if the PI indicators could 
affect the returns of the indices separately. The econometric model of GARCH-M (1,1) (Engle 
et al., 1987; Enders, 1995) takes the following form: 
𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌𝑡) = 𝑎0 +∑𝑎𝑖𝛥𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑦𝑡−1
𝑝
𝑖=0
) + 𝛾ℎ𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡, (1) 
𝑒𝑡~𝑁(0, ℎ𝑡), (2) 
ℎ𝑡 = 𝑏1𝑒𝑡−1
2 + 𝑏2ℎ𝑡−1 +∑𝑏𝑖𝑋𝑡−1
𝑝
𝑖=1
 (3) 
As in the GARCH (1,1) model above, the overall stock market returns and banking stock 
returns are modeled as an AR (1) process, including the overall stock market returns and 
banking stock returns and the variance of the error term. The variance of the error term (ℎ𝑡) is 
an equation of the lagged variance, the lagged squared residuals and the PI indicators (𝑋𝑡−1). 
 
3. Data 
Data on the economic and political variables are collected for 18 OECD countries; the time 
period covers the years from 1993-2013, using quarterly time series data. The countries 
included in the analysis are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Japan, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United 
Kingdom and the United States. 
We test the hypothesis that PI affects stock returns by estimating time series regressions for 
the overall stock market index (general index of each country) and the banking index. Data on 
the two stock market indices are obtained from Thompson Reuters Datastream. Summary 
statistics and unit root tests are presented in Table 1 and 2 for the prices and returns of the 
banking index and the overall stock market index. 
The unit root tests in Table 1 and 2 show that the prices of the indices are non-stationary; i.e. 
they contain a unit root. In contrast to the prices, the returns of the indices are stationary and do 
not contain a unit root (the null of unit root is clearly rejected in all cases). 
The innovation in this paper is that we are using 27 different PI indicators that are mentioned 
in the literature in order to construct five different PI indicators. The aforementioned variables 
are presented in Table 3. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics and unit root tests for Banking Index/Returns. 
 Banking Index-Prices Banking Index-Returns 
Countries 
Mean Min  ADF-stat. Mean  Min  ADF-stat  
 (St. Dev.) Max (p-value) (St. Dev.) Max (p-value) 
Australia 
1.326,45 379,43 -0,32 2,24 -23,82 -4,43 
(560.36) 2.322,47 (0.37) (8.16) 25,25 (0.00) 
Austria 
310,94 117,46 -0,53 0,93 -53,96 -5,04 
(202.78) 896,27 (0.29) (15.88) 42,44 (0.00) 
Belgium 
835,78 92,92 0,81 -0,76 -110,22 -3,83 
(481.87) 1.787,19 (0.79) (22.49) 49,67 0,0001 
Canada 
1.450,79 300,19 -0,18 2,75 -33,22 -5,98 
(765.93) 2.705,25 (0.43) (9.60) 25,66 (0.00) 
Denmark 
1.790,44 425,74 -0,71 1,90 -77,72 -5,89 
(1073.63) 4.596,88 (0.24) (17.88) 72,83 (0.00) 
Finland 
175,40 16,99 0,17 3,83 -51,93 -3,81 
(102.76) 377,14 (0.57) (15.98) 53,29 (0.00) 
France 
460,60 158,70 -0,15 0,78 -66,68 -4,92 
(244.88) 1.054,48 (0.44) (19.01) 54,87 (0.00) 
Germany 
322,20 146,37 0,14 -0,22 -54,17 -4,27 
(137.02) 673,94 (0.56) (17.15) 46,49 (0.00) 
Greece 
1.282,15 59,23 0,29 -2,00 -75,04 -3,26 
(958.22) 3.377,96 (0.61) (23.26) 52,73 0,0006 
Ireland 
2.788,69 48,89 0,66 -2,50 -175,69 -4,01 
(2231.43) 8.057,36 (0.75) (30.29) 62,41 (0.00) 
Italy 
1.462,02 431,24 0,24 -0,36 -44,24 -4,55 
(719.79) 2.945,44 (0.59) (14.92) 51,38 (0.00) 
Japan 
322,20 94,43 -0,64 -1,88 -39,58 -5,12 
(175.65) 691,77 (0.26) (14.07) 35,45 (0.00) 
Netherlands 
2.160,10 117,65 0,64 -2,59 -141,57 -3,03 
(1384.15) 4.695,06 (0.74) (21.89) 37,74 (0.00) 
Portugal 
145,09 17,84 0,52 -1,30 -45,32 -3,71 
(72.75) 345,51 (0.69) (16.40) 50,90 (0.00) 
Spain 
283,77 72,41 -0,45 1,36 -53,84 -5,00 
(128.28) 544,52 (0.33) (15.33) 43,50 (0.00) 
Sweden 
1.642,08 94,42 -0,96 4,06 -41,52 -4,72 
(774.37) 3.210,01 (0.17) (16.36) 64,81 (0.00) 
UK 
5.555,80 1.720,19 -0,55 1,02 -28,63 -4,33 
(2303.04) 9.476,01 (0.29) (12.28) 34,00 (0.00) 
US 
235,85 75,71 0,02 0,52 -59,69 -4,89 
(96.74) 407,26 (0.51) (13.44) 34,58 (0.00) 
 
We used the EFA method to sort these variables and then the PCA method in order to 
construct the five factor variables for our sample. These five PI indicators are named CORR, 
which contains variables that are closely related with corruption; ELECT, which contains 
variables that are closely related with elections and the electoral system; GOV, which contains 
variables that are closely related to the government; RIOT, which contains variables that are 
closely related to riots; and TERROR, which contains variables that are closely related to 
terrorism. For Austria and Germany no data were available for the TERROR indicator and for 
Finland for the RIOT indicator, respectively. The Table A1 in the Appendix A gives information 
about the components for each country by which each PI indicator consist. 
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Table 2. Summary statistics and unit root tests for General Stock Market Index/Returns. 
  General Stock Market Index-Prices General Stock Market Index-Returns 
Countries 
Mean Min  ADF-stat. Mean  Min  ADF-stat  
 (St. Dev.) Max (p-value) (St. Dev.) Max (p-value) 
Australia 
3.593,00 1.794,00 -0,62 1,31 -33,68 -4,93 
(1199.34) 6.432,80 (0.27) (6.97) 16,47 (0.00)* 
Austria 
1.952,55 730,96 -0,46 1,53 -43,18 -4,53 
(1111.25) 4.971,37 (0.32) (12.46) 25,21 (0.00)* 
Belgium 
2.563,72 1.127,02 -0,28 1,00 -32,49 -3,35 
(843.06) 4.591,71 (0.39) (10.42) 24,92 (0.00)* 
Canada 
8.727,21 3.305,50 -0,78 1,68 -33,10 -5,16 
(3176.17) 14.625,00 (0.22) (8.27) 15,60 (0.00)* 
Denmark 
280,66 82,12 0,09 2,39 -45,89 -5,19 
(127.34) 556,56 (0.54) (10.69 25,19 (0.00)* 
Finland 
6.213,31 829,00 -0,75 2,48 -42,02 -4,11 
(3461.98) 16.045,05 (0.23) (17.19) 68,57 (0.00)* 
France 
3.715,07 1.785,71 -0,43 0,87 -36,30 -4,26 
(1253.98) 6.565,97 (0.33) (11.25) 31,67 (0.00)* 
Germany 
4.845,57 1.684,21 -0,32 1,92 -45,91 -4,29 
(1837.63) 8.067,32 (0.38) (13.09) 30,09 (0.00)* 
Greece 
2.309,14 611,16 -0,21 0,11 -47,12 -3,83 
(1369.22) 5.877,90 (0.42) (16.67) 38,28 (0.00)* 
Ireland 
4.325,05 1.275,28 -0,16 1,26 -45,51 -3,52 
(2030.59) 9.432,84 (0.44) (12.28) 29,54 (0.00)* 
Italy 
1.198,24 446,33 -0,35 0,84 -29,68 -4,78 
(460.97) 2.058,23 (0.36) (12.00) 39,59 (0.00)* 
Japan 
14.236,56 8.017,75 -0,96 -0,61 -25,58 -5,73 
(4118.01) 22.379,02 (0.17) (11.05) 22,51 (0.00)* 
Netherlands 
374,47 129,71 -0,28 1,24 -38,19 -4,34 
(138.73) 675,44 (0.39) (12.47) 33,51 (0.00)* 
Portugal 
7.602,52 3.187,65 -0,43 0,75 -29,64 -4,36 
(2685.05) 13.384,90 (0.33) (12.36) 37,68 (0.00)* 
Spain 
7.191,65 230,76 -0,62 0,89 -38,89 -4,59 
(3720.31) 14.974,90 (0.27) (12.41) 39,91 (0.00)* 
Sweden 
759,66 179,63 -0,82 2,30 -34,81 -3,88 
(315.65) 1.368,99 (0.21) (12.31) 37,23 (0.00)* 
UK 
2.467,17 1.356,35 -0,62 1,07 -30,52 -4,56 
(576.31) 3.422,92 (0.27) (8.27) 23,04 (0.00)* 
US 
1.064,36 444,27 -0,30 1,56 -25,56 -4,06 
(320.00) 1.569,19 (0.38) (8.51) 18,95 (0.00)* 
Note: * indicates the rejection of the null of a unit root for the 95% significance level. 
Table 3. Political instability variables.  
Number of cabinet changes Strikes 
Number of constitutional change Guerrilla warfare 
Number of legislative elections Riots 
Legislative Effectiveness Revolutions 
Regulatory Quality Coups D'état 
Rule of Law Number of terrorist incidents per year 
Government crises Number of victims per incident 
Purges CPI index of corruption 
Annual number of anti-government demonstrations Political rights index 
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Voice and accountability Civil liberties 
Political stability and absence of violence Control of corruption 
Government effectiveness Degree of openness 
Government (% GDP) Polity scale 
Assassinations   
Source: WDI (World Development Indicators), CNTS (Cross National Time Series), Kaufmann et al. (2004), GTD 
(Global Terrorism Database), Transparency International, Freedom House International, Penn World Tables, Pol-
ity IV. 
 
As mentioned in the methodology section, we estimated the correlation technique in order 
to find the indicator pairs that are related. The PI indicators that are correlated are excluded for 
further analysis. These are CORR for Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Greece, Japan, 
Portugal, UK and the US; and ELECT and GOV for France and Ireland, respectively. 
 
4. Empirical results 
Table 4 and Table 5 presents the estimation results regarding the effects of PI indicators on 
the banking sector returns and the overall stock market returns, respectively.  In both tables the 
first section presents the mean equation and the second section the variance equation of the 
GARCH-M model. This model allows for testing whether the uncertainty affects Banking 
returns / Stock market returns directly and whether the PI indicators affect Banking returns / 
Stock market returns separately. 
According to the results of Table 4, the Bank returns (GARCH) variable is significant for 
Finland, Germany and Sweden showing that the uncertainty of Bank Returns does itself affects 
Bank Returns, while for the rest of the countries the variable is insignificant showing that the 
uncertainty of Bank Returns does not itself affect Bank Returns. This fact, if viewed in 
conjunction with the fact that some PI indicators are significant means that PI is sometimes 
more important explaining returns than the inherent uncertainty (volatility from the GARCH 
model) of the returns themselves. In the mean equation the PI indicators that are negative and 
significant are ELECT for Denmark (-27.57) and Germany (-23.68) and RIOT for France (-
23.32) and Greece (-141.66). Positive and significant are the GOV indicator for Belgium (35.38) 
and Portugal (14.64), ELECT for UK (10.86) and TERROR for Sweden (29.55). These results, 
showing that PI indicators are affecting Bank Returns not only negatively but sometimes with 
a positive impact indicate that the issue of PI is rather complex and does not provide all 
necessary information when viewed in aggregation. Therefore, the fact that all PI is not ‘bad’ 
for returns, requires from financial analysts to explore further what particular 
types/characteristics of PI might affect one country compared to another. Furthermore, we 
tested for possible autocorrelation of higher order by using the Ljung-box test and for possible 
ARCH effects. The results of Table 2 are very satisfactory and show that there are no signs of 
autocorrelation and ARCH effects in the data. 
In the variance equation the PI indicators that are negative and significant are CORR for 
Ireland (-325.85), ELECT for Greece (-504.26), Japan (-87.04) and Portugal (-616.85), GOV 
for Japan (-57.29) and Portugal (-82.30), RIOT for the US (-168.47) and TERROR for Japan (-
143.02), affecting so the variance of Bank Returns. Thus, we conclude first, that the PI 
indicators have a direct effect on Bank Returns for Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Sweden and the UK while they do not have an indirect effect on the variance of Bank 
Returns; second, that the PI indicators have not a direct effect on Bank Returns for Ireland, 
Japan and the US while they do have an indirect effect on the variance of Bank Returns; and 
third, the PI indicators have both an direct effect on Bank Returns and indirect effect on the 
variance of Bank Returns for Greece and Portugal. Thus, again these results suggest that PI is 
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rather complex and cannot be viewed in isolation of the particularities of every country case. 
Similar to Table 4, Table 5 shows that the Stock Market Returns (GARCH) variable is 
significant for Austria, Japan and Portugal showing that the uncertainty of Stock Market Returns 
does itself affect Stock Market Returns, while for the rest of the countries the variable is 
insignificant showing that the uncertainty of Stock Market Returns does not itself affect Stock 
Market Returns. In the mean equation the PI indicators that are negative and significant are 
ELECT for Denmark (-28.02) and the US (-22.52), GOV for Sweden (-5.69) and RIOT for 
Greece (-65.06) and Italy (-121.71). Positive and significant are the GOV indicator for Belgium 
(16.79) and Japan (9.80) and TERROR for Greece (57.88). These results are showing that the 
PI indicators can affect Stock Market Returns both negatively and/or positively.  
In the variance equation the PI indicators that are negative and significant are ELECT for 
Belgium (-53.52), GOV for Belgium (-60.66) and the UK (-46.32), RIOT for the France (-
121.22) and Germany (-220.38) and TERROR for Ireland (-86.75) and Portugal (-832.31) 
affecting so the variance of Stock Market Returns. Furthermore, two indicators, the CORR for 
France (90.19) and the GOV for Germany (15.95) are positive and significant affecting also the 
variance of Stock Market Returns. Thus, we conclude first, that the PI indicators have a direct 
effect on Stock Market Returns for Austria, Denmark, Greece, Italy, Japan, Sweden and the US 
while they do not have an indirect effect on the variance of Stock Market Returns; second, that 
the PI indicators have not a direct effect on Stock Market Returns for France, Germany, and 
Ireland while they do have an indirect effect on the variance of Stock Market Returns; and third, 
the PI indicators have both an direct effect on Stock Market Returns and indirect effect on the 
variance of Stock Market Returns for Belgium, Portugal and the UK. Here, again the results of 
the Ljung-box test of autocorrelation and the ARCH effects test are satisfactory and show that 
there are no signs of autocorrelation and ARCH effects. 
Furthermore, from table 4 and 5 it is possible to compare the effects that each indicator has 
on each country and among countries. For example, in the mean equation of table 2 the RIOT 
indicator shows to have a negative impact in France while the other indicators did not have 
neither a positive or negative impact. If the RIOT indicator is compared among countries then 
only Greece shows to be negatively affected while other countries are not.1  
 
5. Conclusions 
The present paper empirically examines the relationship between PI, banking stock returns 
and the overall stock market returns during the period of 1993-2013 using time series data at 
country level. We constructed five PI indicators from 27 different PI variables that are 
mentioned in the empirical literature. From the overall results of our study, although we provide 
strong evidence for the existence of a direct negative relationship between the PI indicators and 
Bank Returns / Stock Market Returns and an indirect negative relationship between the PI 
indicators and the variance of the Banking returns and the Overall Stock Market returns (as 
most other studies do), there are a few additional outcomes that need to be carefully considered. 
Particularly, we find that not all PI indicators have negative effects and there are some with 
non-significant and also sometimes positive results. Thus, not all PI is bad for market and 
banking returns. Even more, various PI indicators are affecting differently some countries 
compared to others, while the effect of PI indicators is not always the same for stock market 
and banking returns.  These findings show clearly that the issue of PI is rather complex and 
                                                 
1 Further to our initial analysis that includes all political instability indicators, the models reported in Tables 4 and 
5 were re-estimated with the significant indicators only. The results were not different from the ones reported and 
therefore, for reasons of economy of space are not reported here. Tables and results are available from authors 
upon request. 
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when viewed in aggregation does not provide clear results for particular country cases. We 
believe that studying PI in a country context allowing for idiosyncrasies for every particular 
country are of major importance in understanding the role of PI on stock market stability and 
are of great significance to investors and market regulators. Obviously, the topic is open for 
further research in order to understand the deeper effects of PI on returns and examine in particular 
what are those idiosyncrasies that differentiate the effects for different country cases. 
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Table 4. GARCH-M (1,1) estimates of Bank Returns with political instability indicators in mean and variance, dependent variable Bank Returns. 
Parameter Australia Austria Belgium Canada Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Japan Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden UK US 
Mean equation                         
constant 0.239 -0.812 -23.284* -1.188 7.133 -18.821 12.245+ 19.329* -5.841 4.198 11.231 -1.845 -8.781 -15.636 -1.653 8.459 -1.587 -2.815 
 (0.052) (-0.128) (-2.159) (-0.166) (1.026) (-1.211) -1.945 (2.262) (-0.194) (0.228) (0.499) (-0.224) (-1.006) (-0.767) (-0.159) (0.456) (-0.247) (-0.488) 
Bank Returns 0.137 0.162* -0.226+ -0.068 -0.143 -0.067 0.023 -0.196+ 0.065 -0.214 -0.027 0.132 0.252 -0.030 -0.114 -0.116 0.109 -0.154 
 (0.875) (2.065) (-1.731) (-0.404) (-0.578) (-0.527) (0.218) (-1.905) (0.536) (-0.686) (-0.186) (1.143) (1.604) (-0.288) (-0.669) (-0.585) (0.624) (-0.961) 
Bank Returns (GARCH) -0.006 0,01 0.005 0.025 0.002 0.084+ 0.008 -0.071** -0.018 -0.000 0.004 -0.039 0.004 -0.001 0.017 0.061** -0.022 0.010 
 (-0.114) (0.594) (1.284) (0.764) (0.507) (1.966) (0.724) (-3.095) (-0.431) (-0.163) (1.094) (-1.589) (0.334) (-0.224) (1.029) (2.904) (-1.428) (0.438) 
CORR  3.361   -0.061 4.458 -8.782   -5.019 1.278  -1.491  -33.307 -18.345   
  (0.542)   (-0.008) (0.509) (-1.090)   (-0.503) (0.118)  (0.206)  (-0.507) (-0.894)   
ELECT -7.948 -0.794 2.237 -0.350 -27.569* -2.149  -23.682** 3.076  2.979 3.806 -0.703 12.714 1.105 -5.843 10.859** -6.206 
 (-1.399) (-0.073) (0.239) (-0.039) (-2.792) (-0.346)  (-24.164) (0.164)  (0.151) (0.342) (-0.069) (0.557) (0.113) (-0.788) (18.552) (-0.319) 
GOV 0.093 -3.271 35.383** 5.468 -1.476 5.919  4.486 3.183  10.599 6.407 20.106 14.642* 4.383 -10.269 5.706 3.956 
 (0.019) (-0.466) (14.376) (1.041) (-0.192) (0.522)  (0.789) (0.022)  (1.577) (1.300) (1.487) (2.249) (0.432) (-1.472) (1.004) (0.609) 
RIOT 2.344 7.387 7.877 10.078 2.767  -23.321+ -83.322 -141.660* 5.915 -94.756 -22.063 -54.698 -406.369 -21.444 16.398 -1.289 12.473 
 (0.370) (1.142) (0.839) (0.496) (0.443)  (-1.856) (-1.305) (-2.917) (0.248) (-1.178) (-0.749) (-1.412) (-1.307) (-0.451) (1.522) (-0.059) (1.049) 
TERROR 8.448  -1.805 -4.801 19.136 -10.822 17.545  53.318 12.178 -38.455 15.001 8.524 -63.676 8.778 29.551* -4.688 -1.924 
  (0.909)   (-0.040) (-0.353) (1.445) (-0.959) (0.625)  (1.535) (0.223) (-0.363) (2.271 (1.064) (-1.489) (0.696) (2.242) (-0.329) (-0.245 
Variance equation                         
constant 29.147 101.649* 341.730+ 81.117 170,245 175.799* 85.051 274.771 398.435** 828.568 167.851 143.037** 99.145 645.878** 169.319 106.889 170.362 66.739 
 (0.480) (2.287) (1.773) (1.093) (0.942) (2.045) (0.773) (1.575) (3.750) (1.551) (0.812) (11.879) (0.761) (5.965) (1.191) (0.295) (1.029) (1.308) 
ARCH(1) 0.080 0,073 0.882* -0.019 0,422 -0.087+ 1.341** -0.148+ -0.101+ 0.838 0.022 -0.221** 0.751 -0.055* 0.099 -0.042 0.605 0.107 
 (0.491) (1.032) (2.139) (-0.154) (0.988) (-1.938) (-2.725) (-1.822) (-1.849) (1.164) (0.334) (-3.155) (3.151) (-2.207) (0.560) (90.423) (1.632) (1.183) 
GARCH(1) 0.566 0.703** 0.069 0.457 0,102 0.743** 0.180 0.406 0.556* 0.358 0.532 0.962** -0.012 0.816** 0.555+ -0.002 -0.200 0.811** 
 (0.479) (7.929) (0.696) (0.843) (0.401) (4.565) (1.132) (0.837) (2.401) (1.303) (1.358) (12.474) (-1.019) (8.736) (1.675) (-0.021) (-0.777) (6.186) 
CORR  40.584   -31.803 -80.735 -6.126   -325.857+ -31.167  184.883  -746.573 113.452   
  (1.009)   (-0.179) (-1.322) (-0.041)   (-1.908) (-0.459)  (1.164)  (-0.904) (0.257)   
ELECT -22.557 -164.524 -181.902 0.005 -280.839 -41.986  -1.349 -504.262**  1.588 -87.049** 24.856 -616.858** -44.678 26.637 -23.234 57.156 
 (-0.481) (-1.528) (-1.265) (0.001) (-1.296) (-1.103)  (-0.005) (-2.869)  (0.010) (-22.418) (0.129) (4.838) (-0.319) (0.213) (-0.128) (0.672) 
GOV 16.070 -56.818 -307.993 -52.218 106.791 -91.019   -245.187  -0.959 -57.297** -119.999 -82.305** 16.150) -40.535 -102.505 -69.111 
 (0.237) (-0.979) (-1.367) (-1.313) (1.159) (-1.057)  -181.002 (-1.200)  (-0.016) (-10.899) (-0.694) (-3.850) (0.169) (-0.297) (-0.619) (-1.486) 
RIOT 12.012 -53.211 -90.742 -0.296 56.784  -157.746 (-1.604) 2895.932 -824.900 -8.018 -111.259 -64.589 32.334 19.946 -43.219 -278.265 -168.478** 
 (-0.183) (-0.986) (-0.629) (-0.002) (0.369)  (-0.505) -32.151 (1.192) (-1.321) (-0.009) (-1.114) (-0.075) (0.017) (0.048) (-0.221) (-0.657) (-3.856) 
TERROR -17.930  24.170 -0.136 -14.013 -40.380 107.393 (-0.034) -7.674 -118.419 -1607.973 -143.029** -94.649 25.170 -28.155 -229.109 181.935 11.473 
  (-0.270)   (0.078) (-0.001) (-0.074) (-1.174) (0.157)  (-0.027) (-0.126) (-1.163) (-21.987) (-0.497) (0.294) (-0.266) (-1.666) (0.546) (0.312) 
Diagnostics                         
R-squared 0.085 0,045 -0.001 -0.034 0,037 0,109 -0.056 0.143 0.158 -0.158 0,121 0,022 0,133 0,180 0,074 0,298 0,090 0,025 
Adj R-squared 0.009 -0,035 -0.084 -0.120 -0,058 0,035 -0.129 0.84 0.088 -0.237 0,035 -0,592 0,047 0,112 -0,017 0,228 0,015 -0,057 
DW stat 2.054 1,821 1.362 1.688 1,734 1,939 1.946 1.731 1.827 1.314 1,728 1,987 1,738 1,929 1,893 1,908 1,802 1,550 
Ljung-Box (4) 
0,417 1,184 2,930 1.278 1,558 1,424 0,458 2.1949 2,061 9,412 3,686 5,398 0,735 1,523 1,445 0,880 5,312 3,398 
(0.981) (0.881) (0.570) (0.120) (0.816) (0.84) (0.977) (0.700) (0.725) (0.152) (0.45) (0.249) (0.947) (0.823) (0.836) (0.927) (0.257) (0.493) 
Arch (4) 
-0,663 0,256 -0,529 -0,364 -0,269 -0,837 0,152 -0,521 0,753 -0,001 -1,241 -1,489 -1,395 -0,100 -0,138 -1,424 0,062 0,531 
(0.509) (0.799) (0.598) (0.717) (0.788) (0.406) (0.879) (0.604) (0.454) (0.999) (0.218) (0.141) (0.168) (0.919) (0.891) (0.159) (0.951) (0.597) 
Notes: Values of t-statistics are in parentheses. Bold figures indicate statistical significant coefficients, ** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level (p<0.01), * denotes 
statistical significance at the 5% level (p<0.05), + denotes statistical significance at the 10% level (p<0.1) 
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Table 5. GARCH-M (1,1) estimates of Stock Market Returns with political instability indicators in mean and variance, dependent variable Stock Market Returns. 
Parameter Australia Austria Belgium Canada Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Japan Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden UK US 
Mean equation                         
constant -0.383 18.53** -4.961 6.950 15.349** 14.073 1.155 4.888 -31.792+ -0.668 25.255+ 6.289 0.614 10.492 1.913 23.202+ 1.402 7.267 
 (-0.118) (6.204) (-1.068) (1.449) (2.720) (0.855) (0.219) (0.681) (-1.689) (-0.103) (1.902) (1.010) (0.051) (0.299) (0.275) (1.731) (0.368) (1.627) 
Stock Market Returns 0.026 0.048 0.040 0.223 0.041 0.012 0.189 -0.078 0.225** 0.004 0.020 0.117 -0.144 -0.142 -0.066 0.002 0.092 -0.015 
 (0.133) (0.399) (0.282) (1.605) (0.319) (0.074) (1.229) (-0.622) (2.654) (0.027) (0.126) (0.957) (-0.492) (-0.837) (-0.430) (0.011) (0.789) (-0.086) 
Stock Market Returns (GARCH) -0.009 -0.143** 0.006 -0.062 -0.003 -0.002 0.007 -0.008 0.031 -0.005 0.035 -0.113* 0.006 -0.206+ 0.009 0.0145 0.007 -0.002 
 (-0.206) (-4.934) (0.336) (-1.527) (-0.348) (-0.115) (0.490) (-0.275) (1.038) (-0.340) (0.925) (-2.002) (0.340) (-1.779) (0.845) (0.454) (0.754) (-0.060) 
CORR  15.795*   -6.962 -8.785 -1.997   2.661 -3.519  -14.662  -58.281 -28.855   
  (2.047)   (-1.027) (-0.576) (-0.297)   (0.507) (-0.537)  (-0.912)  (-0.984) (-1.539)   
ELECT -7.744 -7.158 9.953 3.627 -28.021** 5.994  0.899 10.151  -9.962 5.175 -9.632 22.375 2.719 -3.307 8.153* -22.523** 
 (-1.524) (-1.443) (1.411) (0.795) (-4.607) (0.598)  (0.054) (0.804)  (-0.839) (0.547) (-0.876) (0.715) (0.414) (-0.463) (2.367) (-3.747) 
GOV 5.319 -7.723 16.791 0.553 -3.651 -9.514  -0.502 25.262  1.475 9.806* 17.166 8.662 8.677 -5.690* 0.049 -0.205 
 (1.482) (-0.898) (3.479) (0.187) (-0.686) (-0.467)  (-0.095) (0.294)  (0.380) (2.139) (1.448) (1.254) (1.256) (-2.311) (0.013) (-0.041) 
RIOT -3.957 -1.346 6.055 -16.575 5.650  4.254 -22.951 -65.067+ 5.228 -121.712* -12.884 -87.888 -210.876 -13.513 11.684 -13.553 -0.638 
 (-0.487) (-0.256) (0.689) (-1.266) (1.137)  (0.376) (-0.666) (-1.824) (0.447) (-2.146) (-0.475) (-1.194) (-0.990) (-0.563) (0.583) (-0.974) (-0.103) 
TERROR 6.259  -31.491 -0.137 3.956 -21.683 5.578  57.886* 4.320 -82.918 2.949 8.167 -34.324 8.768 15.274 -1.544 -6.692 
  (1.010)   (-11.654) (-0.014) (0.445) (-0.928) (0.210)   (2.143) (0.271) (-1.228) (0.376) (0.665) (-0.778) (0.621) (0.821) (-0.362) (-0.825) 
Variance equation                         
constant 11.259 68.302 21.354 55.538 32.659 190.596 13.162 5.548 231.302 59.374 131.236 91.79 128.996 128.369 63.019 133.464 29.596 21.275 
 (0.539) (1.333) (0.539) (0.863) (0.931) (0.532) (0.488) (0.555) (0.982) (0.955) (0.522) (1.099) (0.873) (0.545) (0.826) (0.899) (1.476) (0.996) 
ARCH(1) 0.380** -0.103 0.201 -0.073 -0.106 -0.106 0.161** -0.123** -0.188** 0.299* 0.243 -0.194 0.131 -0.161** 0.060 0.128 0.685** 0.236 
 (2.537) (-1.534) (1.034) (-0.331) (-0.991) (-1.364) (159.319) (-4.839) (-3.057) (2.117) (0.863) (-1.308) (0.347) (-3.307) (0.573) (0.629) (2.608) (1.569) 
GARCH(1) 0.426+ 0.568 0.590** 0.434 0.534 0.567 0.620** 1.087** 0.322 0.555** 0.002 0.227 0.590 0.404 0.520 0.403 0.374* 0.745** 
 (1.684) (0.977) (2.943) (0.609) (1.357) (0.833) (4.982) (2122.842) (0.586) (2.682) (0.004)  (1.185) (1.444) (1.300) (0.795) (2.330) (5.321) 
CORR  26.041   -36.139 -3.008 90.195+   -19.925 -121.393  -0.977  -1.994 4.143   
  (0.454)   (-0.863) (-0.022) (1.780)   (-0.530) (-1.379) (0.204) (-0.006)  (-0.005) (0.019)   
ELECT 37.155 -50.219 -53.529+ -62.089 2.562 -2.889  -8.711 -132.542  -114.569 32.028 -0.004 -6.559 -16.052 38.712 24.788 -26.898 
 (0.988) (-0.827) (-1.845) (-0.858) (0.061) (-0.021)  (-0.133) (-0.655)  (-0.583) (0.216) (-0.002) (-0.030) (-0.240) (0.504) (1.335) (-1.231) 
GOV -5.230 33.406 -60.662+ 14.466 146.509 -5.555  15.950* 35.716  17.262 -6.277 -0.797 12.039 11.975 -138.028 -46.329+ -10.387 
 (-0.262) (0.307) (-1.696) (0.565) (1.209) (-0.025)  (2.504) (0.023)  (0.306) (-0.121) (-0.006) (0.315) (0.189) (-1.090) (-1.816) (-0.436) 
RIOT 27.141 -44.671 34.908 8.693 10.426  -121.229* -220.385** 78.831 -43.625 515.438 -0.971 -66.310 -3.956 -51.383 -39.712 52.792 -51.679 
 (0.623) (-0.505) (0.498) (0.587) (0.318)  (-2.003) (-4.550) (0.227) (-0.658) (0.614) (-0.003) (-0.071) (-0.002) (-0.201) (-0.441) (0.560) (-1.636) 
TERROR -25.547  175.859 -19.653 3.692 -43.450 -109.979  2.969 -86.755* 97.849 -6.435 -182.941 -832.315** -71.080 1.504 23.601 -9.793 
  (-0.575)  (1.215) (-0.227) (0.092) (-0.136) (-0.869)   (0.008) (-2.049) (0.229) (-0.526) (-1.134) (-2.687) (-1.190) (0.012) (0.889) (-0.169) 
Diagnostics                         
R-squared 0.056 0.144 -0.004 0.039 0.137 0.052 -0.026 -0.023 0.121 0.005 0.018 0.112 0.112 0.073 0.054 0.106 -0.039 0.011 
Adj R-squared -0.022 0.073 -0.088 -0.040 0.052 -0.027 -0.096 -0.093 0.047 -0.062 -0.079 0.038 0.025 -0.005 -0.039 0.018 -0.125 -0.071 
DW stat 1.631 1.669 1.859 2.221 1.909 2.154 2.177 1.845 2.165 1.791 1.817 1.969 1.819 1.602 2.086 1.984 1.897 1.847 
Ljung-Box (4) 
0.855 1.645 3.377 4.244 3.341 1.768 26.786 1.127 1.738 2.459 0.699 8.269 1.599 3.438 1.579 1.930 1.804 1.131 
(0.931) (0.801) (0.497) (0.374) (0.503) (0.778) (0.141) (0.890) (0.784) (0.652) (0.951) (0.142) (0.809) (0.487) (0.813) (0.749) (0.772) (0.889) 
Arch (4) 
-1.407 0.488 -1.262 -0.735 -1.161 0.607 -1.161 -0.751 1.369 -0.554 -1.003 -1.495 0.100 0.019 -1.095 0.015 -0.218 -0.905 
(0.164) (0.627) (0.211) (0.466) (0.249) (0.546) (0.247) (0.455) (0.175) (0.581) (0.319) (0.139) (0.920) (0.984) (0.277) (0.988) (0.828) (0.368) 
Notes: Values of t-statistics are in parentheses. Bold figures indicate statistical significant coefficients, ** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level (p<0.01), * denotes 
statistical significance at the 5% level (p<0.05), + denotes statistical significance at the 10% level (p<0.1) 
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Appendix A. 
Components of political instability indicators. 
 
Table A1. Components of political instability indicators for each country. 
COUNTRY GOV CORR TERROR ELECT RIOT 
Australia 
Regulatory Quality Control of corruption Number of victims per incident Number of cabinet changes Strikes 
Rule of Law CPI index of corruption Number of terrorist incidents per year Number of legislative elections Riots 
Government effectiveness   Government crises Assassinations 
Austria 
Government crises Rule of Law  Number of cabinet changes Riots 
Government effectiveness CPI index of corruption  Number of legislative elections Strikes 
 Voice and accountability   
Annual number of anti-government 
demostrations 
Belgium 
Government effectiveness Civil liberties Number of terrorist incidents per year Number of legislative elections Riots 
Voice and accountability CPI index of corruption Number of victims per incident Number of cabinet changes 
Annual number of anti-government 
demostrations 
Control of corruption   Guerrila warfare  
Canada 
Voice and accountability CPI index of corruption Number of terrorist incidents per year Number of legislative elections 
Annual number of anti-government 
demostrations 
Regulatory Quality Purges Number of victims per incident Number of cabinet changes Riots 
Rule of Law     
Control of corruption     
Government effectiveness     
Denmark 
Government effectiveness Control of corruption Number of terrorist incidents per year Number of cabinet changes 
Annual number of anti-government 
demostrations 
Rule of Law CPI index of corruption Number of victims per incident Number of legislative elections Riots 
   Government crises  
Finland 
Government effectiveness Control of corruption Number of terrorist incidents per year 
Annual number of anti-government de-
mostrations 
 
Regulatory Quality Voice and accountability Number of victims per incident Number of legislative elections  
Rule of Law     
CPI index of corruption     
Civil liberties     
Political rights index     
France 
Rule of Law Regulatory Quality Number of terrorist incidents per year Number of cabinet changes 
Annual number of anti-government 
demostrations 
Voice and accountability Civil liberties Number of victims per incident Number of legislative elections Assassinations 
Government crises Control of corruption    
Germany 
Government effectiveness Control of corruption  Number of constitutional changes Revolutions 
Regulatory Quality Rule of Law  Number of cabinet changes Strikes 
Voice and accountability CPI index of corruption  Number of legislative elections Riots 
Civil liberties     
Greece 
Legislative Effectiveness Voice and accountability Number of terrorist incidents per year Number of legislative elections Riots 
Civil liberties Control of corruption Number of victims per incident Number of cabinet changes 
Annual number of anti-government 
demostrations 
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Political rights index Government effectiveness   Strikes 
Purges CPI index of corruption    
Ireland 
Rule of Law CPI index of corruption Assassinations Number of cabinet changes 
Annual number of anti-government 
demostrations 
Government effectiveness Control of corruption Number of terrorist incidents per year Number of legislative elections Government crises 
Regulatory Quality  Number of victims per incident   
Italy 
Rule of Law CPI index of corruption Revolutions Number of cabinet changes Riots 
Government effectiveness Regulatory Quality Assassinations Government crises 
Annual number of anti-government 
demostrations 
Voice and accountability  Number of terrorist incidents per year Number of legislative elections Purges 
Japan 
Regulatory Quality Control of corruption Assassinations Number of legislative elections Strikes 
Government effectiveness CPI index of corruption Number of victims per incident  Guerrila warfare 
Voice and accountability Civil liberties   
Annual number of anti-government 
demostrations 
    Riots 
Netherlands 
Government effectiveness Regulatory Quality Number of terrorist incidents per year Number of legislative elections 
Annual number of anti-government 
demostrations 
Rule of Law Control of corruption Number of victims per incident Number of cabinet changes Riots 
Voice and accountability CPI index of corruption  Government crises  
Portugal 
Voice and accountability Control of corruption Number of terrorist incidents per year Legislative Effectiveness Political rights index 
Rule of Law Coups D'etat Number of victims per incident Number of legislative elections 
Annual number of anti-government 
demostrations 
Regulatory Quality Purges Assassinations  Riots 
Government effectiveness    Government crises 
Spain 
Legislative Effectiveness Political rights index Revolutions Number of cabinet changes Purges 
Civil liberties Control of corruption Number of victims per incident Number of legislative elections Strikes 
Voice and accountability Regulatory Quality Assassinations   
Rule of Law     
Government effectiveness     
Sweden 
Regulatory Quality Voice and accountability Number of terrorist incidents per year Number of cabinet changes Strikes 
Rule of Law CPI index of corruption Number of victims per incident Number of legislative elections 
Annual number of anti-government 
demostrations 
Government crises Control of corruption Assassinations Number of constitutional changes  
Government effectiveness     
United Kingdom 
Government effectiveness Control of corruption Revolutions Number of legislative elections Riots 
Regulatory Quality CPI index of corruption Guerrila warfare Number of cabinet changes Assassinations 
Voice and accountability  Number of terrorist incidents per year Government crises 
Annual number of anti-government 
demostrations 
  Number of victims per incident  Strikes 
United States 
Voice and accountability CPI index of corruption Guerrila warfare Number of cabinet changes Strikes 
Government effectiveness Control of corruption Number of terrorist incidents per year Number of legislative elections Riots 
Rule of Law  Number of victims per incident Government crises 
Annual number of anti-government 
demostrations 
Regulatory Quality    Assassinations 
